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THE MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE: A
PROCRUSTEAN BED
DONALD V. MORANO*

INTRODUCTION

The United States mail-fraud statute' is one of long lineage.
The first version was passed in 1872, and was followed by three
major revisions, the latest in 1949.2 But since there is little, if
any, extrinsic evidence of congressional intent in passing the
* J.D., U.C.L.A. (1977); Ph.D., Northwestern University (1968); Assistant Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to David A. McGuire and Howard L.
Stone of Stone, McGuire, Benjamin & Kocoras, Chicago, and John G. Noble,
research assistant, and June M. Podewils, typist, in the preparation of this
article.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose
of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at
which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
2. In 1872, Congress passed "An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend
the Statutes relating to the Post-Office Department," ch. 35, 17 Stat. 283
(1872). Section 301 of that Act proscribed the misuse of the post office. Specifically, the Act provided that anyone who devised or intended to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud which was to be effected by opening or
intending to open correspondence with any other person by means of the
post office of the United States, and in executing the scheme placed a letter
in a United States Post Office, was guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of not more than $500 and/or imprisonment not to exceed eighteen
months.
There seems to be no legislative history concerning this provision, and
an equal lack of judicial interpretation. Indeed, the only case decided under
this provision is United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888), which dealt with
the sufficiency of the indictment and made no attempt to construe the law.
The law was revised by Congress in 1889, when it passed "An act to
punish dealers and pretended dealers in counterfeit money and other
fraudulent devices for using the United States mails," ch. 393, 25 Stat. 873
(1889). The revisions are numerous, since a laundry list of counterfeit
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first statute, and its subsequent revisions have been minor, the
schemes and swindles is included. However, two substantive changes in
the law were also made.
First, the laundry list was not included as a substitution for the
"scheme or artifice to defraud" that was found in the 1872 version. It was
inserted as an addition, through the use of a disjunctive. The original language, "devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,"
was followed by a comma and the words "or to," which were followed by the
laundry list. The result was that three basic activities were proscribed:
(1) A scheme to defraud, (2) counterfeit schemes, and (3) various
types of swindles. This disjunctive has remained part of the law, and has
had a profound effect on the use to which the law has been put.
The second major change made by the 1889 Act was to provide that the
violation would occur whenever a person, in executing a scheme, placed or
caused to be placed any letter in a post office. This seemingly minor change
has also remained in the law, and has played a major role in the expansive
use of the present mail-fraud statute.
Two things were not changed: the punishment remained the same, and,
more important, the original requirement that the mailing must be for the
purpose of executing the scheme was unchanged. Once again, there is a
distinct lack of legislative history. However, this version of the law was construed several times by the courts.
By far the most important of the decisions was Durland v. United
States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). In Durland,the United States Supreme Court
held that the word "defraud" in the statute is not identical to the common
law definition of "fraud," which only applies where there is a misrepresentation of an existing or past fact. Rather, the Court held that this law applied to common law fraud and suggestions or promises regarding future
facts or intentions. The key is whether there is a good faith intention to
carry out the promise.
Another major case was Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187 (1895). In
Stokes, the Court set forth the three elements that must be present in order
to have a violation of this law: (1) A scheme to defraud, (2) an intent to
effect the scheme by the use of the United States mails, and (3) an actual
use of the United States mails. Both Durland and Stokes, as well as cases
decided in the circuit and district courts, had one thing in common-they
dealt with situations where one person defrauded another of property,
mostly money.
In 1909 the statute was once again revised. This revised version was
included as part of the United States revised penal laws in "An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States," ch. 321, 35 Stat.
1088, 1130. This version streamlined the laundry list, changed the punishment to a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment of not more
than five years, and made two important substantive changes. First, the
disjunctive was clarified. On one side of the comma is the "scheme or artifice to defraud;" on the other is "obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises." This is followed by the revised laundry list. The result is that the scheme to defraud
is now completely separated from all possible ways of fraudulently obtaining money or property.
The second and more significant change was the removal from the statute of the words "to be effected by opening or intending to open correspondence." This change has resulted in removal of one of the elements of the
offense listed by the United States Supreme Court in Stokes. An intent to
effect the scheme by using the United States mail is no longer necessary.
This point was litigated in United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
The Court held that it is now only necessary that there be a scheme to defraud and that a letter be placed in the United States mails in furtherance of
the scheme. Thus, the requirement is no longer scheming to use the mails
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courts have been responsible for determining its meaning
throughout the more than one hundred-year life of the statute.
Moreover, because its language is susceptible of so many interpretations, the courts have been able to construe the statute expansively, using it as a procrustean bed 3 to fit virtually any
conduct by defendants accused of a wide variety of deception.
Such eminent jurists as Learned Hand and Oliver Wendell
Holmes have extolled the broad sweep of the mail-fraud statute.
They were impressed by the cunning of those bent on fraud and,
accordingly, believed that no construction of the statute should
permit the polymorphously devious to escape its reach. 4 Only
recently, Chief Justice Burger recognized the perduring value of
18 U.S.C. § 1341 as a first line of defense against fraud, i.e., as a
stopgap against a newly-conceived form of fraud until Congress
is able to enact particularized legislation to cope with the
fraud and that a letter be placed in the United States mails in furtherance of

the scheme. Thus, the requirement is no longer scheming to use the mails
in order to defraud; it is scheming to defraud, and happening to use the
mails in the process.
3. In Greek mythology, Procrustes invited travelers to spend the night
as his guests. Procrustes was, however, far from an ideal host. Once he had
succeeded in overpowering his unsuspecting guest, he forced him to lie on
an iron bed and then robbed him. But worse than the robbery was Procrustes' practice of either stretching out or lopping off the legs of his victims to
make their bodies conform to the length of the bed.
Indeed, since the mail-fraud statute has proven so infinitely malleable
for resourceful prosecutors through the years, the high camp of Judge
Learned Hand in referring to the doctrine of conspiracy as "the prosecutor's
darling" might equally apply to the mail-fraud statute. Harrison v. United
States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
4. Holmes has written about the power of Congress to pass the mailfraud statute: "Whatever the limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts
done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy,
whether it canforbid the scheme or not." Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
391, 393 (1916) (emphasis added). Thus, Holmes accepted as permissible
the criminal prosecution of any scheme that meets the vague and unpredictable standard of being "contrary to public policy," notwithstanding the
fact that the object of the scheme is not against the law.
Learned Hand has written concerning the loss that has to be proved to
convict someone of mail fraud:
Civilly of course the action would fail without proof of damage, but that
has no application to criminal liability. A man is none the less cheated
out of his property, when he is induced to part with it by fraud, because
he gets a quid pro quo of equal value. It may be impossible to measure
his loss by the gross scales available to a court, but he has suffered a
wrong; he has lost his chance to bargain with the facts before him. That
is the evil against which the statute is directed.
United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554
(1932). Hand then went on to explain that "If]raud, as colloquially used,
implies some kind of cheating, and cheating ... involves deceit." Id. Accordingly, Hand here construes a requirement for conviction under the
mail-fraud statute as any form of deceit, notwithstanding the fairness of the
transaction (namely, that the defrauded party received a quid pro quo) and
the lack of a basis for a civil action, inasmuch as any proof of damages

would fail.
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scheme. 5 Indeed, federal prosecutors, intent on obtaining convictions and long sentences, will often add mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud to the other offenses with which a
6
defendant is charged.
Two general categories of schemes have been found to violate section 1341: (1) schemes to defraud individuals of money
or other tangible property, and (2) schemes to deprive individuals of intangible rights or interests, which we shall designate "fiduciary fraud."' 7 Examples of offenses in the first category are
insurance fraud, 8 check kiting, 9 and referral-plan schemes in
5. Chief Justice Burger gave as examples of how § 1341 has been used
as a stopgap: (1) To prosecute securities fraud, until the passage in 1933 of
the Securities Act; (2)
to prosecute loan sharks, until the enactment in

1968 of 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896, outlawing extortionate extension of credit;
(3) to prosecute fraud in the sale of undeveloped land, until the passage of
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 in 1969; and
(4)
to prosecute fraud connected with credit cards, until the passage of 15
U.S.C. § 1644 in 1970. He noted further that, even with the passage by Congress of specific laws to prevent fraud in specific spheres, the mail-fraud
statute continues to play an important supplemental role in prosecuting
such fraud. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-08 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974). Former Illinois Governor Otto Kerner and former Illinois Director of State Department of Revenue Theodore Isaacs were prosecuted and convicted of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) to violate the Travel Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1952), and the Mail-Fraud Act (18 U.S.C. § 1341); use of interstate facilities in furtherance of bribery (18 U.S.C. § 1952); mail fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1341); and falsifying tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)). Kerner was
also convicted of perjury before a grand jury (18 U.S.C. § 1623), and of making false statements to Internal Revenue agents (18 U.S.C. § 1001). See also
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (Maryland governor
Marvin Mandel and five others were prosecuted and convicted of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, and mail fraud); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978) (several defendants were
convicted of causing an individual to travel in interstate commerce with intent to promote an unlawful activity, namely bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and mail fraud).
7. The adjective "fiduciary" is used here in the broadest possible generic sense, including any type of deceit by, for example, a trustee, an employee, or other person in whom another party reasonably placed his trust.
The distinction between tangible and fiduciary fraud, no matter what
the slight variations in nomenclature, is found in many recent cases, e.g.,
United States v. Bohonus, No. 79-1449 (9th Cir. April 18, 1980); United States
v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Minkin, 504 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975) (scheme whereby automobiles declared junk
and paid for by other insurance companies were turned over to defendant
salvage dealer for scrap value, reinsured by Hartford Insurance Co., and
then claims were made for the original value on the basis of fictional
crashes, fires and thefts); United States v. Seasholtz, 435 F.2d 4 (10th Cir.
1970) (defendant osteopath who was the attending physician for his wife
devised a scheme to defraud numerous insurance companies by (1) making applications to several insurance companies for health insurance for his
second wife, who usually used her maiden name; (2) lying on each application that she had no other health insurance; and then (3) making claims
to each company for the same coverage).
9. See, e.g., Suhl v. United States, 390 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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which the victim is misled into thinking that he can avoid paying
for purchases by referring new customers to the defendant. 10
The second category of fiduciary fraud involves vote-fraud
schemes" and kickbacks or other secret profits to private or
12
public employees.
Through analysis of the expansive use of the mail-fraud
3
statute, especially as a result of the strained, Pickwickian'
meaning that has been given by courts to "a scheme to defraud,"
this article will show that concern for due process requires that
the courts cease prosecuting fiduciary fraud under section 1341.
Furthermore, the criminal sanctions of section 1341 should not
be imposed on those whose conduct merely falls short of absolute honesty toward others. One way to avoid such an excess in
construing section 1341 is not to allow an indictment which alleges only that the defendant's deceptive practices prevented
391 U.S. 964 (1968) (two defendants created a scheme that involved drawing
checks made out to each other from accounts they each had in two distant
banks; the accounts had insufficient funds to cover the checks, and the time
necessary for the checks to travel to the banks delayed the posting to the
respective accounts); Stevens v. United States, 227 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1955)
(defendant would deposit in his bank account in one city checks written
against his account in a bank in another city despite insufficient funds to
cover the amount, and then reverse the procedure).
10. See, e.g., Nickles v. United States, 381 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1967) (defendant set up a corporation that was used to induce people to purchase
television sets with the promise that if they could find other customers for
defendant's television sets, they would receive commissions; defendant
then advertised to other prospective customers that previous buyers were
paying for the sets without spending money from their own pockets; Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (defendant induced persons
to purchase water softeners by presenting them a plan whereby they could
acquire the softener free of charge, or even make money in the process,
when in fact this plan was impossible); Fabian v. United States, 358 F.2d 187
(8th Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 821 (1966) (similar to the scheme in Nickles,
but involving stereo sets).
11. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (fraudulent voter registrations and applications
for absentee ballots used to influence the outcome of the election of the
Democratic and Republican committeemen in several St. Louis wards; the
court held that even though no deprivation of money or tangible property
was involved, the citizens of St. Louis and the Board of Election Commissioners were defrauded of certain intangible political and civil rights, an offense under § 1341).
12. -See,e.g., United States v. Lea, 618 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1980) (defendant
manager of Safeway meat buying department channeled meat purchases
through a broker who paid the manager kickbacks, resulting in higher meat
prices for Safeway; the manager attempted to conceal this scheme from his
employer by failing to report the use of the broker as was required by
Safeway regulations whenever he used a broker for meat purchases).
13. The word "Pickwickian" is derived from the name of Samuel Pickwick, a character in the Dickens novel, THE PICKWICK PAPERS, who gave
common words peculiar, idiosyncratic, whimsically distorted meanings.
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the victim from making a better bargain than he did, even
though the bargain struck was well within the going rate.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE

Pereirav. United States stated the elements of a violation of
section 1341 as "(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a
letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme." 14 Gregory
v. United States15 effectively illustrates the conduct so proscribed. In Gregory, the defendant postal clerk used predated
cancellations on envelopes in which he mailed predictions concerning college football games for a nationwide weekly contest.
The envelopes were postmarked the Tuesday before the games,
but mailed only after the Saturday games.
Since the fraudulent use of the mails was indispensable to
the defendant's scheme, Gregory seems to be a case for which
the statute was especially designed. However, it is not so apparent that Gregory fulfills the requirement of "a scheme to defraud." Granted, the scheme was dishonest, but it is not
apparent that the dishonesty defrauded either the other contestants or the contest sponsor of something that would justify a
16
conviction for the crime of mail fraud.
"A Mailing"
The mail-fraud statute provides that (1) the defendant must
himself mail something or receive mail or at least "knowingly
cause" mail to be delivered, and (2) the mailing must be "in furtherance of the scheme."' 7 The latter requirement serves only a
14. 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
15. 253 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1958).
16. Certainly the sponsor of the contest suffered no monetary loss, since

the sponsor was required to pay the winner, whoever he might be. The only
party that conceivably had suffered a monetary loss was the contestant who
came in second to the defendant. However, a criminal prosecution would
not provide any personal relief for this party; his only relief would be in a
suit for restitution against the defendant for his unjust enrichment at the
plaintiff's expense.
The issue of whether the defendant in Gregory should have been subjected to conviction under § 1341, therefore, depends on whether a tangible
deprivation was suffered or, if not, whether the defendant's conduct was
subject to criminal punishment for the intangible fraud of depriving the
contest sponsor and participants of their expectations of fair play.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides in pertinent part:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme ... to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, ...

for the purpose of

executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any
post office ... matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing,
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jurisdictional purpose, assuring a reasonable connection between the scheme to defraud and the use of the mails, over
which federal power exists. 18 In fact, each relevant mailing is a
separate offense under the statute. 19 However, the concomitant
requirements that the defendant at least cause the mailing and
that the mailing further the scheme are given an attenuated
meaning. A defendant is deemed to have "caused" a mailing if
he could reasonably have foreseen it.20 Once "caused" is construed to mean "reasonably foreseeable," the added requirement that the mailing be "in furtherance of the scheme" is
or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail ...
imprisoned ...

shall be fined ...

or

or both.

18. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(the defendant former credit director of a store received through the mail
from a collection agency hired by the store invoices billing at $2.50 per account, over the months of the scheme, that were found by the trier of fact to
total more than twice the number of accounts originally referred by the
store).
Justice Rehnquist, in United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 n.10 (1974),
seemingly in response to Chief Justice Burger's argument in dissent that
the mail-fraud statute should be construed broadly to serve as a stopgap
when Congress has not yet passed legislation to cover a new form of fraud,
insists that it is not the role of the courts to serve as legislators: In his
words, "[i] f the Federal Government is to engage in combat against fraudulent schemes not covered by the statute, it must do so at the initiative of
Congress and not of this Court."
Judge Ross, concurring in United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), expressed his serious misgivings,
if not outright disbelief, "that it was the original intent of Congress that the
Federal Government should take over the prosecution of every state crime
involving fraud just because the mails have been used in furtherance of that
crime." Indeed, it is true that instead of being central in many of these
cases, the mailing serves merely as a pretext-a tenuous basis-for the federal court to take jurisdiction and thus there is some concern that the federal courts have infringed the jurisdiction of state courts in this matter.
19. See 2 E. DEvrrr & C. BLAcKmAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 47.18 (3d ed. 1977). See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d

364, 370 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant was charged on seven counts of mail
fraud, "four counts for causing the mailing of the rental checks by Reliance
to Mansion House, and three counts for mailing the awards of demolition
contracts to Reliance and Decco").
20. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (the defendant
"caused" the requisite mailing in the confidence game that he perpetrated
against a wealthy widow by marrying her and, inter alia, inducing her to
have mailed to herself a $35,000 check from her broker in Los Angeles that
she then advanced to him as part of the alleged purchase price for the nonexistent hotel venture about which he had told her); United States v.
Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979)
(a state legislator should have foreseen that owners of automobile dealerships would make use of the mails in transmitting the $20,000 fee that he
had requested from a statewide dealership association for obtaining passage of a favorable bill); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir.
1976) (a city official who strongly intimated to a contractor that he would be
successful in obtaining demolition contracts if he paid the rent for the official's mistress could reasonably have foreseen that the contractor would
pay the rent by mail).
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diluted of any ordinary meaning of purposiveness and made synonymous with any mailing, no matter how tenuously related to
the scheme. The only requirements are that the mailing must
not occur after the scheme has reached fruition, and the mailing
21
must not conflict with the scheme.
In the landmark case of United States v. Maze, 22 the defendant unlawfully used another person's bank credit card at out-ofstate motels, which resulted in the mailing of sales invoices by
the motels to the bank, and by the bank to the credit card owner.
Obviously, if the requirement of "causing" the mailing was satisfied simply by the reasonable foreseeability of the mailing,
standing alone, then the defendant did cause the mailing. The
Court, however, put a gloss on the element of "causing" a mailing that took into account the interrelatedness of "cause" with
the requirement that the mailing be "in furtherance of the
scheme." Accordingly, the Court held that the mailing was not
sufficiently related to the defendant's scheme to bring his conduct within the statute. The Court reasoned that since the
scheme had reached fruition when the defendant checked out of
each motel, the mails were used only for the sake of adjusting
accounts between the motels, banks, and card owner. The mailings could only hinder the scheme because they served only to
facilitate the defendant's detection. As the Court observed, the
defendant would have preferred that the invoices be misplaced
23
rather than mailed by the motels.
21. In United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court
noted that, under the parallel wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, it has
been held that the use of the federally regulated instrumentality need not
even be foreseeable. United States v. Blassingame, 427 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971). Accordingly, the Reid court con-

cluded that, a fortiori, the "in furtherance" requirement for a violation of
§ 1341 should be construed in a "relatively loose manner." 533 F.2d at 1260
n.19. Thus the language of "in furtherance" that on its face bespeaks a requirement of purposiveness is construed by the courts as requiring no more

than that the defendant knew or should have known-in other words that
there was "reasonable foreseeability" of the mailing.
22. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).

23. Id. at 403. The effect of this decision was to curtail any further prosecution of "credit card" swindles under § 1341, i.e., instances in which an
individual either fraudulently secures or fraudulently uses a credit card. As

the Maze Court reasoned, mailings between the defrauded retailer and the

credit card issuer, which necessarily occur after the defendant has fraudu-

lently obtained the goods or services, are not in furtherance of the deceptive
scheme.
Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that even before the Maze decision
had been handed down, Congress had amended the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1976) making illegal the use of a fraudulently obtained
credit card in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce. Rehnquist noted that the lower court had interpreted the above amendment to
the Truth in Lending Act as manifesting a legislative judgment that credit
card fraud schemes should be excluded from the application of the mail-
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However, when the scheme demands continuity and letters
are dispatched to reassure those from whom money has already
been obtained so that the scheme can be pursued against
others, such letters are deemed by the courts to be "in furtherance of the scheme. ' 24 The metaphor of a lullaby is appropriate
because the deceptive practices of such defendants induce a
false sense of security in their victims, who relax their vigilance.
"A Scheme to Defraud"
The Statutory Language
Section 1341 provides in part that a person "having devised
or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations or promises" violates the statute,
provided that the mailing element of the offense has been satisfied. The statute states the object of the scheme as either "to
defraud" or "for obtaining money or property." However, this
disjunctive formulation does not prima facie specify two mutually exclusive violations. It may signify no more than the comfraud statute "unless the offender makes a purposeful use of the mails to
accomplish this scheme." 414 U.S. at 403.
Thus, according to the majority in Maze, Congress's expressio unius est
exclusio alterius; Justice Burger, in dissent, reasoned that even with the
passage by Congress of specific laws to prevent fraud in specific spheres,
the mail-fraud statute should and does play an important role in prosecuting such fraud. Id. at 406-07. Such "overkill" is one of the abuses against
which this article is directed.
24. The Maze Court clearly distinguished the facts in Maze from those
in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962). In Sampson, employees of
a nationwide corporation were charged with a scheme to defraud businessmen of fees on the promise that the defendants would help the victims either to obtain loans or to sell their businesses. Even after the checks
representing the fees had been deposited to the accounts of the defendants,
however, the plan called for the mailing of the accepted application, together with a form letter assuring the victims that the services for which
they had contracted would be performed. The Sampson court found, and
the Maze Court agreed, that the subsequent mailings were designed to lull
the victims into a false sense of security, to postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and to make apprehension of the defendants less
likely than if no mailing had taken place.
See also United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1152, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (the court rejected any Maze defense that the mailings were too late to permit conviction under § 1341, noting that "the
success of the scheme to defraud so far as all participants, and particularly
[GovernorI Kerner and Isaacs were concerned, depended on the continued
concealment of the bribery scheme, and the devious and complicated devices which were used until they finally received the cash benefits of the
bribery. . . ."); Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 230 (9th Cir. 1961) (since

the scheme was not limited to obtaining the purchase price from any particular purchaser and demanded continuity, the letters dispatched to reassure
those from whom money had been obtained, so that the scheme could successfully be pursued against others, were in furtherance of the scheme).
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plementary objectives of a defendant. Accordingly, "to defraud"
might refer to the loss to be inflicted on the victim. Conversely,
"for obtaining money or property" might refer to the gain desired by the defendant.
Contrary to this analysis, however, the courts have construed the alternatives, "scheme to defraud" or "scheme to obtain money or property," as mutually exclusive disjuncts. 25 The
latter scheme has been defined in terms of economic gain of
money or tangible property sought by the defendant. But it has
been defined even more insistently and frequently in terms of
the intended economic loss of the victim as a result of the fraud.
Nevertheless, courts have ruled, especially during the last decade, that a defendant can be found guilty of "a scheme to defraud" because he fraudulently deprived someone of merely
intangible rights. 26 Notwithstanding the absence of both economic loss to the victim and unjust enrichment to the defendant, courts have found that a defendant violated the statute by
27
violating a fiduciary duty.
The courts have sometimes justified the mutually exclusive
construction of the alternatives expressed in section 1341 by noting the parallel language of 18 U.S.C. § 1371, the general conspiracy statute, which makes it a crime to conspire "to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose.'28 Since the second specified object of section 1371 is
conspiracy "to commit any offense against the United States,"
''conspiracy to defraud the United States" has been construed
as proscribing conspiracy to commit an act that, although not
otherwise against the law, contravenes public policy because of
25. See, e.g., United States v. Bohonus, No. 79-1449 (9th Cir. April 18,
1980); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (8th Cir. 1976).

26. See, e.g., United States v. Lea, 618 F.2d 426, 429 n.3 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (2d Cir. 1970); Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1967). But see United States v.
Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the court denied that

profit from the receipt of kickbacks or success of the scheme had to be established, possibly implying that the conviction of the recreant employee

was dependent upon at least a potential monetary loss to the employer. In
the words of the Reid court: "Here we think the evidence established a
scheme to defraud, a scheme to cause Woodward & Lothrop to pay a substantial amount in excess of what could have been rightfully charged the

store on the basis of the number of delinquent accounts referred to Credit
Shield." Id. at 1261-62.
27. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (scheme to cause false and fraudulent absentee

ballots to be counted in a primary election).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), which traces this construction of § 1371 and applies it, pari passu, to § 1341.

19801

Mail Fraud

its deceptive quality. 29 Courts are able to distinguish a section
1341 "scheme to defraud" from a section 1371 "conspiracy to defraud the United States" when the United States is the intended
victim, because a scheme may be concocted by only one person
30
but a conspiracy requires at least two.
The Illegitimate Means Employed by the Defendant
An ambiguity arises from the grammatical structure of the
phrase "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises. .. ." Since the disjunctive "to defraud or for
obtaining money or property" precedes this phrase, it is not
clear whether the specified fraudulent means are intended to
apply to both the clauses "to defraud" and "for obtaining money
or property," or only to the latter. But this ambiguity proves to
be no problem for the courts, for they have responded either
that no affirmative act of misrepresentation need be established
to sustain a conviction, 3 1 or have construed "false or fraudulent
representation" so broadly that it is synonymous with any form
32
of deception.
29. 493 F.2d at 1150.
30. It is black-letter law that a conspiracy is an agreement between two
or more persons, whereas a scheme, as a systematic plan of action, need not
involve more than one person. Thus, defendants often are charged with
both a violation of the mail-fraud statute and conspiracyto violate the mailfraud statute. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,1152 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) ("[clonspiracy is an independent offense,
perhaps more reprehensible than the substantive crime").
31. E.g., in United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 375 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976),
the court, citing United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), noted that no false representations are required to convict someone under § 1341 for "any scheme or artifice to defraud." In United States v. Brodbeck, 430 F. Supp. 1056, 1058-59 (E.D. Wis.
1977), the court concluded: "Brodbeck .

.

. [is] said to have worked this

fraud by 'material omissions of fact', that is by failing to disclose to the bank
[his] personal financial interests detailed in F.I.'s agreement with Robert
Long."
32. Since two adjectives, "false" and "fraudulent," are used as modifiers
of "pretenses," "representations," and "promises," it would seem there is a
difference in meaning between them. Our linguistic analysis, however,
finds a difference only in perspective between these two adjectives. From
the objective point of view, "false" specifies that what the defendant
presented or promised was not true; from the subjective point of view,
"fraudulent" specifies that the defendant intended to deceive someone by
his presentation or promise. To be sure, an individual intending to deceive
another but who is himself misinformed might be guilty of "intent to
deceive" even though he accidentally spoke the truth. Thus a liar always
speaks fraudulently even though he may mistakenly speak the truth.
The adjectives "false" and "fraudulent," however, seem superfluous as
modifiers of "pretenses" because to pretend is to put on a false appearance,
whether by affirmatively simulating what is not true or by negatively dissimulating or concealing the truth. An actor on the stage simulates Lear; a
fugitive from justice dissimulates or disguises his identity. Thus, on its
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FraudulentPromises
Since fraud in section 1341 encompasses deception concerning the future, it is defined more broadly than common law
fraud, which is limited to misrepresentations concerning past or
present facts. The language of section 1341, as well as its predecessors, proscribes "false or fraudulent ... promises." In the
1896 decision of Durland v. United States,33 the Supreme Court
ruled that a defendant could be guilty of mail fraud under the
then-existing statute if he induced another to part with his
money because of promises about the future that the defendant
had no intention of fulfilling. The manifest intent of Congress in
passing the mail-fraud statute was to protect the naive against
use of the mails by confidence men.34 In 1932, under the existing
mail-fraud statute, Second Circuit Justice Learned Hand affirmed the conviction of defendants whom he said had "invei'35
gled their victims into a position of confidence.
face, the statute seems to proscribe affirmative efforts not only to mislead
others, but also to conceal the truth from them.
"False or fraudulent. . . representations," as opposed to "pretenses,"
would seem to emphasize verbal misrepresentations, rather than nonverbal
forms of deception. However, if a representation requires a statement, account, or discourse, then there cannot be a violation of § 1341 by failing to
make a statement or by concealing the truth through silence. Still, however, if "pretenses" is construed as the generic term, encompassing both
verbal and nonverbal forms of deception, then this statute could be violated
by concealing the truth from someone by not telling him what he has a right
to know. However, the statute on its face provides no guidelines for deciding when a person has a duty to make a statement to someone under pain of
prosecution for mail fraud if he does not.
In the recent case of United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir.
1980), the court in effect said that where there is intent to defraud by means
of deception, the specific form of deception used is irrelevant. In the words
of the court: "Congress has not undertaken to catalog the infinite variety of
the myriad schemes to defraud that might be concocted by the fertile minds
of those bent on despoiling others by cunning. It has branded criminal any
use of the mails knowingly and intentionally to achieve a fraudulent end."
Such nominalistic definitions, however, are not very helpful since they are
circular, defining what is "a scheme to defraud" as any scheme intended to
achieve a fraudulent end, and then defining "a scheme intended to achieve
a fraudulent end" as a scheme to defraud. In the words of one court: "To
try to delimit 'fraud' by definition would tend to reward subtle and ingenious circumvention and is not done." Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205,
211 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1934).
In short, no misrepresentation of fact is required if the scheme is reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence. See, e.g.,
United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1249 n.10 (8th Cir. 1976); Silverman
v. United States, 213 F.2d 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
33. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
34. Id. at 313.
35. United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S.
554 (1932).
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Although these espoused sentiments of protecting the public from confidence artists are commendable, there is nevertheless an evidentiary problem with which these two reviewing
courts did not grapple: how can the trier of fact be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's intention was
fraudulent ab initio rather than the result of a change of mind at
a later date? In short, how can the trier of fact be sure that the
defendant committed criminal fraud and not merely a breach of
contract? To be sure, if a defendant makes spurious promises to
more than one victim over a period of time, then perhaps the
conclusion that the promises were fraudulent is inescapable.
Since section 1341 proscribes not fraud itself but "devising or intending to devise a scheme to defraud," achievement of the
36
fraudulent aim is not essential to a violation.
Fraud in the Inducement
The expression "fraud in the inducement" means nothing
more than the language of section 1341, i.e., obtaining "money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises." Thus, "fraud in the inducement" will be
used to mean depriving someone of money or property, and any
misrepresentations, pretenses, or false promises that are material factors in inducing a victim to agree to a bargain.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973); United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir.
1970); Post v. United States, 407 F.2d 319, 326 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1092 (1969).
Furthermore, since a defendant need only "intend to devise a scheme"
to violate the statute, a defendant can be found guilty even though he never
in fact hatched a scheme. Thus, on its face this criminal statute would punish not only those who plan such a scheme, but also those who plan to plan
such a scheme. If it is difficult to establish that someone has in fact devised
a scheme, afortiori it would be well nigh impossible to enter the mind of
the defendant, as it were, to determine that he had indeed formed the intention of devising such a scheme some time in the future. However, we have
not unearthed any cases that have gone this far.
It is the fundamental principle of criminal law that criminality turns
upon a concurrence of prohibited action and criminal intent. When the famous actor Garrick declared that he felt like a murderer whenever he acted
Richard III, Dr. Johnson, the moralist, retorted: "Then he ought to be
hanged whenever he acts it!" But criminal law cannot punish the mere harboring of evil intentions.
[AJ s no temporal tribunal can search the heart or fathom the intentions
of the mind, otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it cannot know. For which
reasons, in all temporal jurisdictions, an overt act, or some open evidence of an intended crime is necessary ... before the man is liable to
punishment.
4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 21.
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The rub is that "material factor" is hardly susceptible to facile definition. A rule of thumb, however, is that a material factor
is any misrepresentation, pretense, or false promise but for
which it is likely the agreement might never have been struck.
Any further attempt to make this "but for" rubric more precise
demands attention to the facts of a particular case in the totality
3 7
of its circumstances.
When the misrepresentation or false promise concerns not
the product sold but the buyer's motive for purchasing it, then it
is more difficult to decide whether the misrepresentation constitutes "fraud in the inducement." For example, assume that a
clean cut young man sold Bibles from house to house throughout the Bible Belt in the southeastern United States during his
vacation from college and pretended that he was studying to be
a preacher, to receive special consideration from these devout
people. Assume further that these orders were filled by mail.
Would he be guilty of fraud in the inducement, and therefore of
mail fraud?
A 1936 Second Circuit case 38 was analogous: the appellant
corporations sold stationery through agents. The corporations
were concerned that the misrepresentations of their agents,
such as that the call was long distance, that the agent knew an
officer of the company called, and that the stationery was specially discounted-all stratagems to get by secretaries on the telephone and to get the purchasing agent to listen to the seller's
agent-might constitute violations of section 1341. Consequently, the accused corporations through their officers and
their attorney in effect agreed to be indicted and expeditiously
tried upon certain "admissions and stipulations" of fact consti37. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 836 (1977) (the defendant, who ran a leasing service that assisted
persons wishing to file applications for oil and gas lease drawings by the
Bureau of Land Management, entered into contracts with many persons
that they would never have entered had they known that he would resort to
various forms of concealment, nondisclosure, and fraud to deprive them of

the economic interest in valuable leases that they had won in the drawings); Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1961) (persons were induced into paying as much as $1,200 for supposedly exclusive
distributorships of a product, when in fact the identical, though differently

named, product was marketed by many other franchisees); Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (defendant induced persons to
purchase water softener by presenting to them a plan whereby they could
acquire the softener free of charge or even make money in the process,
when in fact this plan was impossible); Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d
400 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 920 (1955) (the defendants induced
persons to invest in oil and gas interests by diverse misrepresentations and
promises that grossly misrepresented the actual interests).
38. United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.
1970).
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tuting the alleged crime. The defendants were found guilty and
fined.
The Second Circuit deplored the lack of any evidence of the
customers' reaction. The court noted, however, that the false
representations listed in the stipulation were only preliminary
to the salesman's solicitation, and that price and quality of the
merchandise were always discussed honestly. Thus the court
reversed the convictions, noting that to affirm would imply that
any untrue statement designed to obtain the sympathetic ear of
a potential customer comes within the purview of the mail-fraud
statute. In its reductio ad absurdum argument, the court gave
as examples of misrepresentations extrinsic to the bargain signs
such as "going out of business in 30 days," "fire sale," and "bankruptcy sale" that, when untrue, would have to violate section
39
1341.
There was no evidence that customers would not have
purchased the stationery but for any of the misrepresentations.
For example, there was no showing that once they learned of the
misrepresentation they felt cheated. The court's analysis indicates that had there been such evidence, the convictions would
have been upheld. Similarly, the student selling Bibles would
have to be found guilty, since undoubtedly many of the purchasers would never have bought them butfor his misrepresentation
that he was studying to become a preacher.
Furthermore, the courts have ruled that a seller can violate
section 1341 even though he is not guilty of a misrepresentation
of fact.40 Representations of the value of a product may therefore go so far beyond the proper limits of the enthusiasm or
"puffing" of the typical salesman, or the mistaken judgment of
41
the honest man, as to impress them with the badge of fraud.
39. Id. at 1178.
40. In the eloquent words of Learned Hand:
It is no longer law that declarations of value can never be a fraud. Like

other words, they get their color from their setting, and mean one thing
when exchanged between traders, and another when uttered by a broker to his customer. Values are facts as much as anything else; they
forecast the present opinions of possible buyers and sellers, and con-

cern existing, though inaccessible, facts.
United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d, 747, 749 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554
(1932).
41. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 920 (1955) (the defendant expressed opinions concerning the future productivity and profitability of leases that his experience
would never have justified and that were so exaggerated that they exceeded
permissible sales talk). Accordingly, fraudulent opinions, although not
qualifying as common law fraud, are prosecutable under § 1341 just as are

fraudulent promises and fraudulent schemes that do not succeed.
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Fiduciary Fraud as CriminalDisloyalty
The most significant and expansive use of section 1341 has
been its application as a weapon against fiduciary fraud. The
courts, however, have insisted that not every breach of every
fiduciary duty, standing alone, works a criminal fraud.42 Nevertheless, prosecutors have, with outstanding success, prosecuted
public4 3 and private 4 4 employees, politicians, 45 and union officials 46 under section 1341. They have struck against political
corruption and employee disloyalty in both the public and pri47
vate sectors.
The Defense of Constructive Fraud
In

1949, when the doctrine of fiduciary fraud was still an un-

derdeveloped basis for liability under the mail-fraud statute, the
42. See, e.g., United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 764 (6th
Cir. 1949).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant was St. Louis building commissioner); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d
641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976) (defendant was press
secretary for Mayor Daley); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975) (defendant was Cook County, Illinois
clerk with full responsibility for obtaining insurance on voting machines);
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574
(1941) (defendants were various members of the Levee Board of the state of
Louisiana); United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1969) (defendants were state of Louisiana employees, for example, executive secretary to
the governor).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendants were insurance agents); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976) (defendant was a purchasing
agent); United States v. Brodbeck, 430 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (defendants were officers of a mortgage corporation).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (defendant was congressman from Michigan); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant was governor of Maryland); United States v.
Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976) (defendant was an alderman of Chicago); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (one defendant was Governor Kerner
of Illinois).
46. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967) (affirming the
conviction of union officials of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
of mail fraud for financially rehabilitating a real estate enterprise in which
many of the petitioners had important interests); United States v. Bane, 433
F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mich. 1977), affid, 583 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979) (conviction of union leader for fraud concerning
union funds).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 513-14 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
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Sixth Circuit in Epstein v. United States8 reversed a conviction,
holding that the defendants' violation of their fiduciary duty constituted no more than constructive fraud and, accordingly, fell
short of the actual fraud necessary to convict someone under
the statute. But since Epstein, defendants charged with fiduciary fraud have invoked the defense of constructive fraud, generally to no avail.
In Epstein, two of the defendants had directorates in breweries and brewery supply companies. The government argued
that because the breweries bought from those suppliers, and because the defendants did not disclose their conflict of interest,
the defendants were guilty of mail fraud. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, noting that the breweries had suffered no loss, nor had the defendants been unjustly
enriched because of their undisclosed conflict of interest. In
short, the court found that these transactions carried the earmarks of arm's length bargains and did not depend upon deception. They were not only fair to the corporations, but were even
below the market price.
The court held that mere nondisclosure of the conflict of interest could not constitute actual fraud because under applicable law directors can contract with one another or on behalf of
their corporations with other corporations in which they are interested. Such contracts are valid so long as they are advantageous and made in good faith. Consequently, the defendants
had no duty to make their profit from these transactions available to the breweries, and there is no reason to believe that it
would have made any difference to the breweries had they
known of the interests of the defendants in the supply companies.
The court defined active fraud as "intentional fraud, consisting in deception intentionally practiced to induce another to
part with property or to surrender some legal right, and which
accomplishes the end designed. It requires intent to deceive or
defraud. '49 Thus, the court recognized both tangible and intangible proprietary and fiduciary fraud but, in contrast to the discussion above, the court required that the fraud succeed to
constitute a crime. 50 Aside from insisting that the fraud be "intentional," the court has provided little elucidation of the conduct subsumed under this rubric.
48. 174 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1949).
49. Id. at 765.
50. See note 36 supra.
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In effect, the court defined "constructive fraud" privatively,
i.e., as fraud that falls short of active or actual fraud. 5 1 The court
intimated that constructive fraud, although it breaches a legal or
equitable duty, nevertheless lacks an element of moral guilt,
perhaps because it falls short of intentional, full-blown fraud.
The Unjust Enrichment of the Defendant
Although the courts generally deny that conviction for
fiduciary fraud requires proof of pecuniary or other property
loss, they nevertheless find that whenever an employee receives
52
kickbacks, the employer is in fact defrauded to that extent.
The argument is that if the party doing business with a company
is willing to pay kickbacks to its employee, then this party is
willing to enter into an agreement with the company at least as
favorable to the firm as a bestowal of the discount on the company itself. Thus, the self-serving employee is unjustly enriched
by the kickback. 53 However, the courts do not generally rest
51. The three definitions of constructive fraud given in Epstein are:
(1) Constructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, in spite
of the fact that there is no moral guilt resulting from the breach of duty, the
law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate
public or private confidence, or to injure public interests; (2) Constructive
fraud may be found merely from the relation of the parties to a transaction
or from circumstances and surroundings under which it takes place; and
(3)
Constructive fraud is a term that means, essentially, nothing more
than the receipt and retention of unmerited benefits. 174 F.2d at 766.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1973).
53. We see the equivocation of the court in United States v. George, 477
F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973), in which a purchasing
agent of Zenith received kickbacks from a supplier of cabinets to Zenith.
On the one hand, the court distinguished George from Epstein by the fact
that in Epstein "non-disclosure did not generate a profit at the corporation's
expense." As the court reasoned:
No refuge can be taken in Zenith's policy "normally" to allow suppliers
a 10% profit and in Accurate's prices being within that margin. Nothing
would have prevented Zenith from bargaining with Accurate for a
lesser profit margin, and it would be unrealistic to presume that Zenith
would consider the fact of better than $100,000 in actual kickbacks to its
buyer-over $300,000 in agreed-to-kickbacks-to be immaterial in its
dealings with Greensphan. It is preposterousto claim that Zenith would
have spurned such a discount if offered.
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, the court did not rest its case on the monetary loss
suffered by Zenith, predicating a second source of criminal deprivation for
Zenith on "losing the opportunity to bargain with a most relevant fact
before it." In support of its position, the court quoted Judge Learned
Hand's construction of the meaning of "a scheme to defraud" in § 1341 in
United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554
(1932):
A man is none the less cheated out of his property, when he is induced
to part with it by fraud, because he gets a quid pro quo of equal value.
It may be impossible to measure his loss by the gross scales available to
a court, but he has suffered a wrong; he has lost his chance to bargain
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guilt upon the employee's unjust enrichment at the expense of
his employer. Instead, they have invoked the rhetoric of disloyalty, e.g., the employer/victim has been deprived of the ability to
bargain with the knowledge of relevant facts; 54 the public or the
private employer has been deprived of the disinterested judgment of the public official55 or private employee,5 6 respectively;
been deprived of the impartial services of an
or the citizens have
57
elected official.
In many cases the defendant either lied in a conflict of interest statement or failed to submit one that was required. 58 In
with the facts before him. That is the evil against which the statute is

directed.
Judge Friendly, however, limited the validity of these dicta in United
States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400-01 (2d Cir. 1976). He noted that the Second Circuit had already in United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421
F.2d 1174, 1179-82 (2d Cir. 1970) "declined, in the area of private decision
making, to follow the letter of Judge Learned Hand's dictum ... that 'false
representations, in the context of a commercial transaction, are per se
fraudulent despite the absence of any proof of actual injury to any customer'." Id. at 1400.
Judge Friendly went on to note, however, that public officials could be
subject to what we have designated "fiduciary fraud," i.e., the improper exploitation of their public positions to enhance their private advantage, often
by taking bribes. So, for example, in United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091,
1103-05 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975), the defendant, who
had full responsibility for obtaining insurance on voting machines and re-

ceived "brokerage fees" from companies to whom he awarded the contracts,
was rightfully found guilty of mail fraud, notwithstanding the fact that the
insurance commissions had to be paid by the state to someone and the state
had suffered no monetary loss. According to Judge Friendly, Barrett's conviction was proper since he, as a public official, had been paid to act in
breach of his public duty, so that his conduct possessed the requisite element of corruption. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1400.
By contrast, in Dixon, the defendant had done nothing more than fail to
mail a correct proxy solicitation. There was no contemplated pecuniary
loss to anyone, nor contemplated gain by the defendant, and this activity
was in the private sector. Accordingly, the court did not have to decide
whether the doctrine of fiduciary fraud should be given effect in the private
sector whenever "the element of corruption" is present. The court noted
that if the defendant had bribed a corporate official to put out a proxy statement known to be incomplete, then an element of corruption would have
been present. Id.
54. See note 53 supra.
55. See, e.g., cases cited in note 43 supra.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Reece, 614 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1980) (defendants received "brokerage fees" from certain packers who sold beef
trimmings to their employer); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant was governor of Maryland); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534,
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976) (defendant was alderman of
Chicago); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974) (defendant Kerner was governor of Illinois).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976) (Mayor Daley required those required by law to
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other cases the defendant resorted to stratagems to camouflage
his conflict of interest.5 9 Perhaps in other cases a defendant did
no more than the defendants in Epstein: failed to disclose a conflict of interest.60 Thus, there is a spectrum of conduct ranging
from affirmative misrepresentations to artful concealments to
acquiescence in misleading appearances performed with an explicit duty to disclose, and these same affirmative misrepresentations, artful concealments, and acquiescences in misleading
appearances and failures to reveal with no explicit duty to disclose. The courts have frequently glossed over the issue of a
duty to disclose, accepting any one of the above acts as evidence
of "disloyalty" and moving quickly to find in any manifestation
file statements of economic interests with the clerk of Cook County to file
copies of such statements with the mayor's office; although defendant Bush,
press secretary and director of public relations for Mayor Daley, reported
his stock holdings in DAAI in the original, he presented a doctored copy of
his conflict of interest statement to Mayor Daley's office in which he wrote
"none" where disclosure of his interest in DAAI was called for); United
States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912
(1976) (Bryza assumed a bogus name, formed a phony company, and lied
on his annual company statement that he had no conflict of interest);
United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973) (Zenith had a conflict of interest policy providing that no gratuities of
any nature were to be bestowed on its purchasing department's employees
by suppliers; defendant Yonan, a purchasing agent, twice fraudulently
signed documents embodying that policy, which was annually brought to
the attention of all suppliers of Zenith by letter).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1365 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Governor Mandel of Maryland misrepresented or concealed the names of
the true owners of Marlboro racetrack from the Maryland General Assembly during its 1972 session for the purpose of obtaining legislation
financially beneficial to Marlboro); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 643
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976) (Bush told Dell, with whom
he was a joint venturer in the advertising work done by DAAI at O'Hare
Airport for the city of Chicago, that "his [Bush's] name should never be
used in connection with any work regarding the airport contract;" furthermore, in an apparent effort to conceal his interest in DAAI, Bush was paid
the $40,000 he received from DAAI by Information Consultants, who served
as a conduit for the payment, receiving checks payable to it from DAAI, and
in turn making checks payable to Bush for such amounts); United States v.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (one of
the defendants, Governor Kerner, mailed an IRS form 1099 interest payment notice to Mrs. Everett, and a copy of this to the IRS; however, Mrs.
Everett had made no loan to Kerner; rather, the "interest" reported on the
form was a deceptive method of legitimizing the backdated note presented
to Mrs. Everett in 1966 at the time of Kerner's acquisition of Chicago Thoroughbred Enterprise Stock to make the bribe appear to be a 1962 sale and
purchase).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976) (former alderman of Chicago and chairman of
the city council's committee on finance participated in a scheme to
purchase, through an investment company, tax delinquent property from
county-sponsored scavenger sales, and voted on certain matters that favorably affected property the investment company had purchased without disclosing his interest to the other aldermen).
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of "disloyalty" evidence of "a scheme to defraud," and thus a
violation of the mail-fraud statute. 61 We are therefore left with
the question of whether the courts have so relentlessly whittled
away at the defense of constructive fraud that in fact today a
court will find disloyalty in any self-serving activity that is not
disclosed to the proper person. Thus, without further ado the
court will find fiduciary fraud and a violation of section 1341.
The Seventh Circuit'sExpansive Reading of Section 1341
The most important development and articulation of fiduciary fraud as a basis for mail-fraud conviction occurred in Chicago in the early 1970s in the United States attorney's office.
This doctrine of fiduciary fraud was not developed out of
wholecloth, however. As early as 1942, in United States v. Proctor & Gamble,62 a federal district court held that the disloyalty
of an employee can constitute mail fraud. Proctor &Gamble was
found guilty of mail fraud for bribing employees of a competitor
to divulge confidential information of their employer. The court
concluded that whoever tampers with the employer/employee
relationship for the purpose of causing the employee to breach
63
his duty is in effect defrauding the employer of a lawful right.
Five major Seventh Circuit cases hammered out the contours of the doctrine of fiduciary fraud. In United States v.
George,64 Yonan, a cabinet buyer for Zenith Radio Corporation,
was indicted with two other defendants for violating the mailfraud statute. The grand jury charged that for nearly four years
Yonan had received kickbacks on Accurate Box Corporation's
sales of cabinets to Zenith. The indictment alleged that the
scheme deprived Zenith of its money, and of the honest and
loyal performance of Yonan's duties. After a jury trial, the defendants were found guilty, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
convictions.
Yonan had been given the responsibility to procure cabinets
for Zenith's new "Circle of Sound" product. During the indictment years, Accurate, whose president was a codefendant, was
61. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979),
quoting with approval United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 652 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976): "[A n employee owes his employer a
duty of loyalty which includes a duty not to conceal facts known to him
which he has reason to believe are material to the employer's conduct of its
business and affairs."
In Mandel,Bush, and Brown the defendants were found guilty of violat-

ing § 1341 for such disloyalty.
62. 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).

63. Id. at 678.
64. 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
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the sole bidder on, and supplier of, the cabinets. Zenith normally allowed its suppliers a maximum of ten percent profit, and
Accurate's prices reflected that profit margin. The president of
Accurate agreed to pay Yonan $1 per cabinet on the Circle of
Sound unit, and later per-cabinet kickbacks on other models.
All of this was contrary to Zenith's express conflict of interest
policy, which prohibited members of its purchasing department
from receiving any gratuities from suppliers. Yonan twice
signed documents embodying that policy.
The president of Accurate admitted receiving annual letters
from Zenith that brought this policy to the attention of its suppliers during the period he was channeling payments to Yonan.
A number of other Zenith employees testified, however, that
Yonan did not give Accurate preferential treatment, but insisted
on quality and efficiency from Accurate.
The court found no dispute about sufficiency of the evidence
to establish use of the mails. Consequently, it was necessary to
find only a scheme to defraud in order to establish mail fraud.
The court explained that no proof was required that Zenith was
actually deprived of Yonan's honest and loyal service through
actual preferential treatment for Accurate. All that was necessary was that the supplier paid a fee with the intent of receiving
preferential treatment. The court, however, concluded that
Zenith was in fact deprived of Yonan's faithful services, inasmuch as he had solicited no potential competitors of Accurate,
and had deprived Zenith of the significant knowledge that Accurate would accept less profit than it was receiving, thus depriving Zenith of the opportunity to bargin with that knowledge.
The court found duplicity: Yonan held himself out to be a
loyal employee acting in Zenith's best interest, but he actually
compromised that interest for the sake of his own profits. Thus,
all three defendants who had participated in the scheme to deprive Zenith of Yonan's faithful services were found guilty of
mail fraud.
In United States v. Bryza,65 the defendant was charged in
four separate mail-fraud indictments. The allegation was that
Bryza, while a purchasing agent for International Harvester
Company (I-H), accepted payment from various I-H suppliers in
violation of the company's express conflict of interest policy.
The government contended that these payments deprived I-H of
its right to Bryza's faithful services and to the money that he
obtained. Bryza was convicted on all counts.
65. 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976).
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The Seventh Circuit upheld his conviction, noting that he
had set up a sham consulting company, taken a fictitious name,
and demanded that payments be made to him through the "consulting" company as a condition for favorable treatment from
I-H. The court found it immaterial that I-H had discharged
Bryza on learning of his arrangements for receiving gratuities.
It was also found to be irrelevant that the quality and prices of
the items purchased by Bryza were acceptable to I-H and that,
after terminating him, I-H retained relations with the companies
from which Bryza was receiving kickbacks.
What ultimately mattered, the Seventh Circuit held, was
that Bryza's efforts to cover up his breaches of fiduciary duty
(e.g., assuming a bogus name, forming a phony company, falsifying his annual conflict of interest statements) manifested the
requisite specific intent to defraud I-H. I-H was deprived of
Bryza's honest and faithful services; it was entitled to negotiate
purchases with the knowledge of its employee's interest.
In United States v. Keane,66 a twenty one-count indictment
was returned against former Chicago Alderman Thomas Keane.
The indictment alleged a mail-fraud scheme in which Keane
would purchase through nominees, in some cases with advance
information, tax-delinquent real estate in Cook County scavenger sales. These properties would be held in land trusts without
disclosure of beneficiaries, and would receive favorable treatment through city council removal of encumbrances without disclosure of Keane's interest. Keane himself would vote to
authorize acquisition of parcels near his own properties, and he
used his position and influence to aid in the sale of the properties to private and governmental interests.
The indictment alleged that the scheme defrauded the city
of Chicago, its citizens, and Keane's fellow aldermen of their
right to "conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and unbiased services, decisions, actions and performance of official duties" on his part, and to have the city's business conducted
"honestly, impartially, free from deceit, craft, trickery, corruption, fraud, undue influence, dishonesty, conflict of interest, unlawful obstruction and impairments, and in accordance with the
'67
laws of the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago.
At trial the government introduced evidence of Keane's
"scheme to defraud:" (1) He used inside information to determine which tax delinquent properties should be bought by his
newly-formed Alpine Investments Corp. He told an unindicted
co-conspirator to buy in a particular area because a "big govern66. 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
67. Id. at 538.
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ment project" was going up. Only after the tax sale, however,
was there a public announcement that the area had been designated for study to see if it qualified for urban renewal. Thus,
Keane's inside information was indispensable to the project.
(2) Keane participated in city council proceedings without
disclosing the matters in which he had a financial interest. He
introduced proposals to benefit his own properties and then
voted on them without divulging his interest.
(3) Keane put pressure on the chairman of the Chicago
Housing Authority (C.H.A.) to purchase Keane's properties.
Such pressure could be inferred from the fact that the C.H.A.
acquired or considered acquiring some parcels despite the fact
that they were improperly zoned, were outside a certain area,
and were significantly more costly than similar properties acquired by C.H.A. Because of this evidence, the trial court found
Keane guilty of mail fraud, and the Seventh Circuit upheld his
conviction.
In United States v. Isaacs,6 8 Otto Kerner, former governor of
Illinois and then a United States judge for the very Seventh Circuit that upheld his conviction, and Theodore Issacs, former
state director of revenue, were convicted of, inter alia, mail
fraud. They had solicited and purchased shares in two horse
racing corporations for a fraction of the market value of the
stock from a controlling shareholder. Through a clandestine,
circuitous route, the defendants each gained $159,800 from sales
and dividends on stock that had cost them only $15,079 apiece.
In return, they exerted political influence by initiating legislation favorable to the racing industry and by manipulating the
Illinois Racing Board to assign valuable racing dates to tracks
owned by the corporations.
The court noted that despite this scheming, none of the
competitors of the corporations had lost any racing dates, and
state revenues from horse racing had actually increased from
$19.1 million to $40 million during the course of the scheme.
Nonetheless, the court found the defendants guilty of mail
fraud, concluding that Kerner had deprived the state and its citizens of his honest service as governor, and had deprived racing
associations of the right to obtain racing dates free from corrup69
tion.
In United States v. Bush,70 Earl Bush, who for eighteen
years had been press secretary for Mayor Richard J. Daley of
Chicago, was convicted of violating the mail-fraud statute, and
68. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
69. Id. at 1150.
70. 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
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the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 1961 and 1962, a new terminal
and other facilities were being constructed at O'Hare Airport.
To facilitate completion of the work, Mayor Daley established an
informal committee to negotiate contracts for the concessions at
O'Hare. At that time, Bush's company, Terminal Art, Inc.
(whose successor was DAAI) entered into a joint venture agreement with Dell Display, Inc. for the negotiation and service of an
O'Hare advertising contract with the city of Chicago. The joint
venture agreement provided that John and Robert Dell would do
the advertising work and that DAAI would hold the contract
with the city. The services that Bush performed were minimal.
Furthermore, he instructed Dell that under no circumstances
should Bush's name ever be used in connection with the contract.
Bush several times spoke in favor of DAAI to the deputy
mayor, who headed the committee responsible for awarding the
O'Hare concession contracts. The deputy mayor placed great
weight on Bush's recommendation because of his promotional
expertise, but also took into account DAAI's experience, the aesthetics of proposed displays, and the fact that DAAI was a local
company that guaranteed the city a substantial sum. Consequently, the deputy mayor recommended that DAAI be given
the contract, and it was. Before renewal of the contract, Bush
met with the city commissioner in charge of O'Hare and discussed a particular display in the airport terminal. At this meeting Bush said, "I have no ideas [sic] of telling you this is good
because it is a revenue producer, because I have no connection
whatsoever with the company."
Between 1962 and 1967, Bush received $40,000 from DAAI.
He was paid by a circuitous route, obviously intended to conceal
his interest in the transactions. In 1972 he submitted a copy of a
conflict of interest statement to the mayor's office. The copy had
"none" typed in, but the purported original statement had the
typed words "Dell Airport Advertising. '71 When Mayor Daley
later read news reports of Bush's conflict of interest, he interviewed Bush, and on Bush's admission that the allegations were
true, discharged him.
The court noted that there was no contention that the contracts between the city and DAAI were anything but advantageous. In fact, the city continued its contractual relations with
DAAI even after the disclosure of Bush's role in the firm. What
constituted the "scheme to defraud" under the mail-fraud statute, however, was the breach of Bush's fiduciary duty in depriving "the City of Chicago, its mayor, officials and employees of
71. Id. at 645.
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the opportunity to bargain with all relevant facts in their possession. '72 Beyond this, the court found that Bush's elaborate
scheme to conceal his interest in the contract, and his affirmative misrepresentations to both the mayor and commissioner,
manifested the intent to defraud.
Constructive FraudNot a Defense
In each of these five cases, although there was undoubtedly
a cover-up by the defendants, the Seventh Circuit rejected constructive fraud as a defense. In George,73 the defendant twice
failed to disclose in signed conflict of interest statements the
kickbacks that he was receiving. In Bryza,7 4 the defendant received kickbacks in violation of his employer's express conflict
of interest policy. In Keane,75 the defendant's profiteering from
zoning changes demanded an elaborate operation to conceal his
activities from his fellow aldermen. In Isaacs,76 Kerner devised
a complex system to camouflage the fact that he had been
bribed to grant selected racing dates to certain racetracks. In
Bush,77 Mayor Daley's professed disapproval of any interest on
the part of his aides in companies that dealt with the city caused
the defendant to falsify a conflict of interest statement submitted to Mayor Daley's office, and to arrange to be paid by the advertising corporation by a circuitous route. Thus, in each of
these cases, the scheme depended upon an interested party's
lack of knowledge of the scheme.
78
These cases are therefore distinguishable from Epstein,
since in Epstein disclosure by the defendants of their interest in
companies doing business with breweries of which they were
corporate officers would have made no apparent difference.
Since the agreements were favorable to the breweries, in fact
more favorable than the market prices of the materials supplied,
the other corporate officers would readily have approved the
transactions. Nevertheless, what is disturbing about such a ratio decidendi in the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the defense of
constructive fraud is the way in which any attempt to deceive is
construed as a "scheme to defraud" in violation of section 1341.
Accordingly, a defendant who is guilty of any deception such as
a cover-up, on its face a mode of behavior which, standing alone,
should merit no more than moral stricture, is found eo ipso
72. Id. at 647.
73. 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
74. 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976).
75. 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
76. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
77. 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
78. 174 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1949).
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guilty of the crime of mail fraud, provided there is an incidental
mailing.
The Eighth Circuit: Limiting the Scope of FiduciaryFraud
In United States v. States,79 the Eighth Circuit unequivocally affirmed fiduciary fraud as a basis for conviction under section 1341. The court affirmed convictions for mail fraud and
conspiracy to commit mail fraud based on a scheme to have absentee ballots of fictitious and fraudulently registered voters
mailed and counted in a primary election. The court noted that
the definition of fraud in section 1341 has been broadly and liberally construed since the passage of the original mail-fraud statute in order to serve as an effective weapon against use of the
mails to promote fraudulent enterprises. Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that a "scheme or artifice to defraud" need not concern
money or property; such a scheme was realized by depriving the
public and election authorities of certain intangible political and
civil rights. 80
In subsequent Eighth Circuit cases, however, the court has
attempted to limit (the court's own characterization was to "restrict the expansion of") the scope of section 1341.81 The Eighth
Circuit, citing authorities such as Epstein and George, has ruled
that fiduciary fraud alone is not enough to convict a person of a
violation of section 1341.82 This bald proposition seems innocuous at first, but on further reflection may be seen to contain the
seeds of the ultimate rejection of fiduciary fraud as a basis for
conviction under this criminal statute. If we find the ingredients
79. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
80. The court ruled in States: "The language of the statute on its face
does not preclude a finding that a 'scheme or artifice to defraud' need not

concern money or property." Id. at 764. "The focus of the statute is upon
the misuse of the Postal Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Con-

gress clearly has the authority to regulate such misuse of the mails." Id. at
767.

81. In United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976), the court

concluded:
While we sympathize with the zealous prosecutor's view in this case

that tipping has no place in the administration and operation of a governmental agency, this does not transform the practice into a mail fraud
violation, nor does it give the prosecutors a license to inject themselves
into local affairs to attempt to rectify the problem. To permit the Government to do so in this case would effect a further extension of§ 1341 so
as to cover all actions which might offend the Government's sense of personal propriety. This we refuse to do, particularly since our acceptance
of the Government's theory in this case would have far-reaching ramifications as to the reach of the already pervasive mail fraud statute.

Id. at 1252 (emphasis added).
82. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.

1116 (1979).
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of fiduciary fraud to be all aspects of the scheme that do not involve pecuniary or other property loss by the victim, we are led
to the startling conclusion that section 1341 can be violated only
when the defendant is guilty of something more than fiduciary
or attempted to defraud the victim
fraud, i.e., he has defrauded
83
of money or property.
In 1976 in United States v. McNeive, 84 the Eighth Circuit reversed the mail-fraud conviction of St. Louis's chief plumbing
inspector. The court held that it was contrary to regulation for
the defendant to accept mailed $5 checks as tips from a particular contractor for each application from the contractor for
plumbing permits. Nevertheless, several factors militated
against a finding that the inspector had the fraudulent intent
contemplated by section 1341. These factors were: (1) the unsolicited nature of the gratuities; (2) the nondiscretionary nature
of the permits; (3) the lack of any evidence of the defendant's
bending the regulations in favor of this contractor, all of whose
applications were in order and thus automatically entitled to
licenses; (4) the absence of any evidence of attempts by the defendant to misrepresent or conceal the tips; and (5) the lack of
any monetary loss to the city. In short, the court found that to
uphold the conviction for conduct that it called "cupidity," "a minor peculation, possibly a misdemeanor," would impermissibly
extend the scope of section 1341.85
83. How is fiduciary fraud to be defined except in terms of conduct that
bespeaks disloyalty of some kind? But if we consider the failures to reveal
a conflict of interest, attempts to conceal, and active forms of misrepresentation of secret profits (on the one hand) and prescind from, or bracket, the
issue of whether or not there is a pecuniary or property loss that results

from this less than perfectly open conduct (on the other hand), then such

deceptive practices would be included within the definition of "fiduciary
fraud, standing alone." Accordingly, all forms of deception, independent of

pecuniary or proprietary loss, are encompassed within the definition of "fiduciary fraud, standing alone." Consequently, since conviction under § 1341
requires more than "fiduciary fraud, standing alone," monetary or proprie-

tary loss by the victim should be required for conviction under § 1341.

On the other hand, if "fiduciary fraud, standing alone" is something

other than these acts, then it does not seem to have any reality at all. Accordingly, it would seem to be empty rhetoric, providing a defendant with
no guidelines for his defense, that his conduct is no more than "fiduciary
fraud, standing alone."
Although this dilemma may appear sophistical, still, as the Eighth Cir-

cuit attempts to reconcile its decisions with Seventh Circuit cases, we realize that it is far from clear in the minds of the judges exactly what are the
contours of "fiduciary fraud, standing alone."
84. 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976).

85. Although the rhetoric of McNeive specifies a lack of fraudulent intent as the ratio decidendi, such an argument is truly a petitio principii,

since no scheme to defraud is found because of lack of fraudulent intent
and no fraudulent intent is found because of no scheme to defraud. Instead, it would seem that the true reason for the court's reversal of
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In attempting to reconcile its decision with Seventh Circuit
cases, the Eighth Circuit found that in George and Bryza the
defendants' receipt of kickbacks, standing alone, would not have
been enough for their conviction under section 1341. On the contrary,, monetary loss by their employers was an essential element for the defendants' convictions. 6 This rendition of the
meaning of George and Bryza seems contrary to the actual holdings. Although the Seventh Circuit noted that the unjust enrichment of the employees at least constituted a discount that could
have been reflected in the contracts struck by the disloyal employees, it ruled nevertheless that their convictions did not re87
quire proof of pecuniary or property loss to their employers.
Furthermore, this interpretation of George and Bryza
seems to abandon the proposition enunciated in States that no
monetary or other proprietary loss is a prerequisite to conviction under section 1341. However, a more limited interpretation
of that dictum is that conviction of an employee in the private as
opposed to public sector requires that his employer suffer some
economic loss from the fraud. 88 The Eighth Circuit, however,
implies that an elected public official can be convicted under the
statute in spite of the absence of any tangible loss. Thus, it
found that Chicago's Alderman Keane, who secretly used inside
McNeive's conviction was its refusal to uphold a conviction for the violation
of such a trifling duty.
86. 536 F.2d at 1250.
87. See note 53 supra.
88. Even in its analysis of Bush, however, the court noted that the defendant's concealment of his interest in an advertising agency and use of
his official influence to induce the city to issue an advertising contract to his
agency deprived the city of the opportunity to secure the most economi-

cally favorable contract. 536 F.2d at 1251. It found, however, that Bush's
conduct was cognizable under § 1341, since his failure to provide honest and
faithful service was combined with his material representations and active
concealment. Thus the city's economic loss was not necessary for Bush's
conviction.
One wonders what failure to provide honest and faithful service could
be, beyond Bush's material misrepresentations and active concealment.

Also, since the contracts were, as the Bush court admitted, the best possible
contracts that the city could have expected to obtain, it is an error for the
court in McNeive to try to distinguish Bush from McNeive in terms of

Bush's depriving the city of an opportunity to secure the most favorablecontract.
In United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1025 n.19 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979), the Eighth Circuit again construed the nature

of the scheme to defraud found in the Seventh Circuit case of United States

v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1974), in

terms of potential monetary loss to the city of Chicago. Since the defendant
in Barrett,a county clerk responsible for obtaining voting machines and the
insurance on them, allowed to be considered in the pool only those companies that were willing to supply kickbacks to him, the court concluded that
the city might have obtained rates lower by at least the amounts of the kickbacks.
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information to purchase properties owned by the city, could be
convicted of mail fraud because the citizens were deprived of
their right to honest and fair dealing in the conduct of his of-

fice. 89
In United States v. Rabbitt,90 the Eighth Circuit further limited the sweep of section 1341. The defendant Rabbitt, a member of the Missouri House of Representatives between 1960 and
1976 and majority floor leader for much of that period, was convicted by a jury on eleven counts of mail fraud. 91 Rabbitt had
agreed to introduce a longstanding friend who was a partner in
an architectural firm to state officials who might be able to secure contracts for the firm. Rabbitt was paid a fee of ten percent
for all work resulting from these introductions. As a result of
this arrangement, he received almost $23,000 from the firm for
both city and state contracts attributable to his influence.
The Eighth Circuit reversed his conviction, since it found
"the concept of fraud upon the public" falls within the ambit of
the mail-fraud statute only "where dishonest conduct by a public official directly implicates the functions and duties of that official's public office."'92 Thus the court found that not every
breach of public trust in connection with a mailing falls within
the confines of section 1341. The court saw no evidence that
Rabbitt's use of his influence to aid the architectural firm to obtain contracts resulted in inferior work, greater expense, or any
other tangible loss to the citizens or state. Thus, his conviction
could not be affirmed on the basis of tangible fraud.
Moreover, Rabbitt did not control the awarding of state contracts to architects, nor was there evidence that he had failed to
carry out his legislative duties for the sake of the architectural
firm. Furthermore, the government referred to no standard of
conduct applicable to legislators that clearly required disclosure
of his interest in the architectural contracts. The court deplored
Rabbitt's unethical conduct in violation of (1) the legal Code of
Professional Responsibility, (2) a candidate-disclosure statute
requiring disclosure of fees received during the preceding
twelve months, and possibly (3) a Missouri law prohibiting "partiality" or abuse in public office. However, the court held that
89. 583 F.2d at 1025 n.20.
90. 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978).
91. Rabbitt was also charged and convicted of three counts of extortion
and one count of attempted extortion. However, of these three distinct con-

victions, based on three different series of events during his public life, only
the third one for mail fraud concerns us here. Indeed, the defendant's conviction for mail fraud was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. See United States
v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979).

92. Id. at 1024.
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these practices did not constitute a "scheme to defraud" under
93
section 1341.
By underscoring the fact that not every fiduciary fraud constitutes a violation of section 1341; 94 by denying that a defendant
can have the requisite intent to defraud when there is no evidence of his taking the initiative or attempting to conceal gratuities received; 9 5 by requiring a showing of monetary loss by a
96
victim to convict an employee in the private sector and, possibly, even a nonelective public official; 97 and by requiring that the
charge of fiduciary fraud against an elected public official relate
directly to the duties of the office itself,98 the Eighth Circuit has
done much, without fanfare, 99 to limit the far-reaching sweep of
the mail-fraud statute. Although the court conceded, in United
States v. McNeive, 10 0 that section 1341 can reach activities that
contravene public policy or moral standards, at the same time it
denied the government a conviction under section 1341 for conduct that :merely offends the government's sense of personal
propriety. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit has at least impliedly
rejected these amorphous bases for conviction under section
1341.
93. Id. at 1026.
94. United States v. Rabbitt, 538 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir.
1976).
95. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1251 (8th Cir. 1976). The
court characterized the sums received by the defendant as "unsolicited gratuities," and underscored the lack of any material misrepresentations by
the defendant "in order to assure continuation of the gratuities
scheme. . . ." Id.

96. Id. at 1250.
97. The McNeive court found that in United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976), the city of Chicago was deprived "of the opportunity of securing the most economically favorable contract." 536 F.2d 1245, 1251 (8th Cir. 1976). Also, however, the McNeive court
found that in Bush "the defendant had made conscious and calculated efforts to actively conceal the nature and scope of his enterprise." Id.
See also United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1025 n.19 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). The court cited United States v. Barrett,
505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975), as standing for
the proposition that the public was defrauded of some potential tangible
gain, inasmuch as the defendant county clerk responsible for obtaining voting machines and the insurance on them, by allowing only companies that
were willing to supply kickbacks, in the pool to compete for contracts, deprived the city of possible lower rates equal to the amount of the kickback.
98. United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1026 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
99. See note 81 supra.
100. 536 F.2d at 1252.
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THE MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE AND DUE PROCESS

There are limits to the proper scope of the criminal sanction,
and contrary to dicta in some of the reported cases on the mailfraud statutes, a difference should be observed between immorality and criminality: "There must remain a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not
the law's business."1'0 Even though the report which made this
statement was concerned with the criminal status of homosexual offenses and prostitution, it nevertheless unequivocally rejected any synonymy of morality and criminality. Furthermore,
it also rejected as one of the functions of the criminal law the
10 2
fostering of morality.
101.

REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES & PROSTITU-

TION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, para. 13 (1963).

102. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT specifies as the objectives of the criminal
law: "preserv[ing] public order and decency, . . . protect[ing] the citizen
from what is offensive or injurious, and . . .provid[ing] sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who
are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind, [or]
inexperienced. . . ." Id. A careful reading of this quotation reveals the two
paramount purposes of the criminal law to be preserving public order and
protecting those who cannot protect themselves.
The publication of this report engendered a vigorous debate in England, with Lord Patrick Devlin concluding that the Committee had in fact
erred in concluding, for example, that private homosexual acts between
consenting adults should be legal. According to Devlin, "[n] o society can
do without intolerance, indignation, and disgust; they are the forces behind
the moral law, and indeed it can be argued that if they or something like
them are not present, the feelings of society cannot be weighty enough to
deprive the individual of freedom of choice." P. Devlin, Morals& the Criminal Law, in MoRALIrrY &THE LAw 40 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971). Thus, public morality is viewed by Devlin as "morale," i.e., the espirit de corps
necessary to preserve a society. This is similar to Hegel's argument for the
morality of war, since, according to Devlin, when a society criminalizes that
about which it feels "intolerance, indignation, and disgust," (id.), it attains
a solidarity and vitality that would not be possible without such a source of
unified opposition. See also P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
(1965).
Professor H.L.A. Hart, while agreeing with Lord Devlin that social morality is important to preserving a society, objected:
The use of legal punishment to freeze into immobility the morality
dominant at a particular time in a society's existence may possibly succeed, but even where it does it contributes nothing to the survival of the
animating spirit and formal values of social morality and may do much
to harm them.
H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY & MoRALrry 72 (1963).

The ultimate reason for Hart's rejection of Devlin's argument seems to
lie in his viewing freedom of choice as the highest value of a society, whose
existence is indispensable for the preservation of society. According to
Hart, who cited as his authority against Devlin the classical conservative
Edmund Burke,
[T] he value of established institutions resides in the fact that they have
developed as the result of the free, though no doubt unconscious, adaptation of men to the conditions of their lives. To use coercion to maintain the moral status quo at any point in a society's history would be
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FiduciaryFraudan Improper Basisfor Conviction
Invocation of fiduciary fraud to justify section 1341 conviction violates not only substantive due process (since it equates
moral notions of "disloyalty," "faithlessness," and "the subordination of the interest of another towards whom one has a duty in
the pursuit of one's own interest" with criminal conduct) but
also procedural due process. 10 3 The sixth amendment requires
that criminal offenses be precisely defined to provide reasonable
forewarning of what acts are criminal and what are not. 10 4 Furthermore, to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
05
them.
artificially to arrest the process which gives social institutions their
value.
Id. at 75.
103. Procedural due process means simply the rights of fair notice and
fair opportunity to be heard. In the words of the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
In contrast, substantive due process concerns the fundamental rights that
accrue to someone as a person: in the words of the Declaration of Independence, the rights to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
Thus, a person charged with the crime of being a Jew in Nazi Germany
might be granted every conceivable procedural consideration; his judge
might observe scrupulous care in guaranteeing that all the rights of notice
and a fair hearing were observed. Still, it is an affront to substantive due
process that he should be charged with the crime of being born of a Jewish
mother. Here the injustice of the criminal statute itself is established by
appealing to a transcendental or metaphysical sense of fairness. Accordingly, any actual legal system or criminal code must be consonant with this
recognition of imprescriptable rights of the person, otherwise it will violate
substantive due process.
The case of the Jew charged with the crime of being a Jew is an egregious example of violation of substantive due process. So, also, is any other
status crime. But even to a lesser extent, according to Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), it is unfair and, according to our analysis, a violation of
substantive due process, for a court to take jurisdiction unless there exist
the minimum contacts that make it proper for the court to do so. So, also, in
those cases of fiduciary fraud in which there is nothing more than the failure by the defendant to be totally honest and above board with another, but
in which he does not profit at the expense of the other, it is improper and a
violation of substantive due process to prosecute the defendant under any
criminal statute at all.
104. See note 103 supra.
105. Laws that fail in this standard violate the due process clause of the
fifth or fourteenth amendments, depending on whether federal or state action is involved. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that a city anti-noise ordinance prohibiting a person
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The courts, however, have deliberately left the meaning of
"a scheme to defraud" so vague and all-encompassing that any
deceptive conduct in which there has been an incidental mailing
fits this procrustean statute. 10 6 The violence thus done to any
ordinary meaning of "scheme to defraud" is dramatically illusadjacent to a building in which a school is in session from willfully making a

noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order

of the school session, is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In
reaching its decision, the Court provided us with the proper standard that
should be used in testing whether a statute is unconstitutional because of
vagueness:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend
several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a
vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms."
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
unlawful zone' .
clearly marked."
Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted).
106. The word "defraud" can be used under so many circumstances to
denote the perpetration of evil that it is almost as broad as the word "evil"

itself.

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

143 (1969) defines "defraud" as

"1. To deprive (a person) by fraud of what is his by right, either by fraudulently taking or by dishonestly witholding it from him; to cheat, cozen, be2. fig. To deprive or cheat (a thing) of what is due to it; to
guile ....
withhold fraudulently." To understand this definition, one must know the
meaning of "fraudulently," which the same dictionary defines as "in a
fraudulent manner, by fraud, with intent to defraud or deceive, dishonestly,
wrongfully." Id. at 517. Ultimately, an understanding of these words requires a definition of the common root word "fraud," which the same dictionary defines as follows:
1. The quality or disposition of being deceitful; faithlessness, insincerity. Now rare ....
2. Criminal deception; the using of false representations to obtain an
unjust advantage or to injure the rights or interests of another....
3. An act or instance of deception, an artifice by which the right or
interest of another is injured, a dishonest trick or stratagem. ...
4. A method or means of defrauding or deceiving; a fraudulent contrivance; in mod. colloq. use, a spurious or deceptive thing.
Id. at 516.
Apart from the definitional circularity that would confound a person
seeking to determine his exposure to criminal liability under the "scheme
to defraud" portion of § 1341, these definitions sweep wide enough to encompass almost any conduct the government might without specific advance warning consider wrongful.
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trated in a recent Ninth Circuit case 10 7 in which the court upheld the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (section 1341's
counterpart proscribing wire fraud) of defendants who were in
the business of hunting debtors for their creditors. The court
found that the defendants, in misrepresenting themselves over
the telephone as postal or phone company employees to gather
confidential information, had conducted "a scheme to defraud"
by depriving post office and phone company patrons of their
right of privacy. 10 8
Perhaps there should be some criminal law that applies to
the conduct of these defendants, but surely only a Pickwickian
construction of "scheme to defraud" permits such a prosecution
under this statute. So, also, one may rejoice that the mail-fraud
convictions of Governor Kerner' 0 9 and, in a similar case, Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland, 1 0 were upheld because they
took bribes for assigning lucrative racing dates. But such satisfaction misses the point. The question is not whether Kerner
and Mandel should have been convicted of crimes, the question
is whether they were properly convicted under the mail-fraud
statute.
Does it not strain credulity to argue that it was the intent of
Congress to include such conduct within the purview of section
1341? Does it not strain the ordinary meaning of words to say
that citizens have been criminally defrauded because the activities of the ex-governors of Illinois and Maryland vitiated their
loyalty to the citizens and thus vitiated their judgment in all
their official decisions? Even though it appears to violate procedural due process to find the conduct of Kerner and Mandel to
be within section 1341, their acts of compromising their fiduciary
duties for the sake of personal gain nevertheless seem to be
properly subject to some type of criminal sanction. In contrast,
however, it seems that a case such as Bush"' should never have
been prosecuted under any statute. There is in Bush simply no
evidence of corruption,which should be a sine qua non for in107.

United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 896 (1978).
108. Id. at 1387.
109. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
110. In United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), Governor
Mandel's conviction was upheld since the court found that by misleading
the citizens of Maryland, as well as the legislature and racing commission,
about the ownership of the racetrack, his business involvements with
others, and his receipt of bribes, Mandel had deprived the citizens of the
conscientious, loyal, faithful, and honest performance of his duties as governor to which they were entitled.
111. United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976).
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voking a criminal sanction. The defendant simply did not profit
at the city of Chicago's economic expense in any but the most
strained interpretation. Although Bush submitted a doctored
copy of his conflict of interest statement and went to great
lengths to conceal his interest in the advertising agency whose
services he had recommended to the city, it nevertheless seems
farfetched to construe such conduct as "a scheme to defraud,"
even in the sense that he had subordinated the city's interests to
his own. In fact, the advertising contract was a most favorable
one for the city, manifesting all the earmarks of an arm's length
transaction. Indeed, even after Bush's conviction, the city
signed another contract with the same agency. Furthermore,
Bush cannot be construed as a case of unjust enrichment, as in
the many kickback cases invoking the mail-fraud statute, because Bush's profit from his interest in the agency did not, even
according to a most strained construction, represent a monetary
t2
loss to the city."
Although Bush's conduct was not exemplary, and may have
lacked moral uprightness, it nevertheless seems inappropriate
to have prosecuted him at all, since such conduct seems to be of
that realm of private morality or immorality which is not the
business of the criminal law. Perhaps it was reprehensible for
Bush to deceive Mayor Daley; perhaps the mayor and other city
officials deceived by Bush deemed this to be a violation of his
duty of loyalty and honesty to them. But such moral outrage,
which rightly might result in the discharge of an employee (as it
did in Bush's case), is hardly the stuff of which criminal convictions should be made. Thus, Bush's conviction violated procedural due process in the procrustean manner in which the
standards for conviction under section 1341 were construed to fit
the facts of the case. It also violated substantive due process,
since Bush, as the court itself admitted, 113 gave the city the best
possible advice in recommending his own advertising firm, and
thus in no way sacrificed his duty to the city for personal gain.
That Mayor Daley was especially sensitive about conflicts of
interest and would not have permitted Bush to maintain his interest in the firm, had it been disclosed by Bush himself, is the
112. The McNeive court strained in attempting to uphold Bush, finding a
concomitant pecuniary loss with the loss of the faithful and honest service

of Bush which it characterized as a deprivation of the city's "opportunity of
securing the most economically favorable contract." United States v.
McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1251. But how in fact could the city have received a
better contract if it had known of Bush's interest in the advertising agency,
unless Bush were to be disgorged of his unjust enrichment and his profits
awarded to the city as a discount in the contract struck? Procrustes would
be hard put to fit Bush to his bed.
113. 522 F.2d at 648.
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obvious reason why Bush went to such lengths to conceal it. He
wanted to retain both his city job and his interest in the agency,
but he knew that Mayor Daley would not approve. Bush may
have been guilty of personal faithlessness, but this is hardly "a
scheme to defraud," even according to the most abstract analysis of the intangible loss suffered by the city of Chicago and its
residents. Bush's lack of candor with Mayor Daley and the
mayor's deputy could fall under the rubric of interpersonal relationships, or at most private immorality, but not criminality.
Immorality No Justificationfor CriminalSanctions
If someone can be convicted of mail fraud for the vague reason that his "conduct ... fails to match the reflection of moral
uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing
in the general business life of members of society,"" 4 then everyone is at the mercy of changing community moral values of
honesty, loyalty, and trust. One is threatened by the prospect of
prosecution for mail fraud, notwithstanding a transaction's fairness, if only because a personal interest in the transaction was
not disclosed. Of course, openness and loyalty on the part of an
employee, whether in the private or public sector, is commendable. However, only in a theocracy like Calvin's Geneva or colonial Salem would criminal sanctions be expected for such
5
nondisclosure."
114. See, e.g., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976): "[T]he 'law puts its imprimatur on ...accepted moral standards and condemns conduct which fails to match the 'reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right

dealing in the general and business life of members of society."' (citations
omitted.)
2 DEVITT &BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 47.04
(1977) reports concerning § 1341:
The court is not required to answer a juror's question, after some
deliberation had taken place, as to the difference between "fraudulent"
and "unethical" conduct, when the original charge properly presented
the essential elements and defenses. United States v. Middlebrooks,
431 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
115. John Calvin (1509-64), a Protestant reformer who became the dominant influence in Genevan affairs, envisioned Geneva as a theocracy in
which the saints would rule. God's covenanted community was to be based
on his-law, as revealed in the scripture. No detail of civil or community life
was too remote, too secular, or too petty to escape inclusion by the
Calvinists in the ecclesiastical sphere of supervision or regulation.
Calvin's conception of the relationship of church and state was that
even though the personnel of church government and state government
were virtually identical, the two organizations should be distinct in their
functions. It was the function of the church community to decide upon doctrine and to maintain moral discipline by spiritual censures; it was the function of the state to enforce this discipline upon recalcitrants.
Idolatrous or heretical beliefs, Catholic religious practices, and misbehavior ranging from public complaints about Calvin to serious sexual
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PROPOSAL TO LIMrr THE SCOPE OF THE MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE

Because conviction for mail fraud, a felony, may bring imprisonment for five years on each count, and because each mailing may constitute a separate count, it seems much too harsh to
convict a defendant under this statute for anything less than
seriously criminal conduct. Accordingly, a court should reverse
the conviction of any defendant charged with violating section
1341 through no more than a violation of fiduciary duty. To be
sufficient, an indictment should allege-that the defendant used a
fraudulent scheme to obtain tangible gain at another's expense.
Moreover, the willingness of courts to find the requisite intent to defraud from mere nondisclosure of relevant information
should be obviated by a jury instruction that does not beg the
question. 116 The jury instruction should explain that when the
defendant's conduct can be explained by other than fraudulent
intent, then the prosecution has not met its burden of proof of
fraudulent intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, since section 1341 is a mail-fraud statute, enabling the federal courts to take jurisdiction and having as its
purpose protection of the public from the perpetration of fraud
by the use of the mails, the courts should reinstate the centrality
of the mailing as a requirement for conviction. To tighten this
"mailing" requirement, the "but for" standard should be used to
interpret what it means "to knowingly cause the use of the
mails." 117 Thus, the mailing must have been an indispensable
crimes were ruled on by the elders with the pastors in a body called a Consistory. If the accused was not penitent or if the lapse was serious, the accused could be handed over to the city government for further investigation
and punishment. The only punishment the Consistory itself could administer, however, was excommunication, and this was a real threat in an age
when the sacraments were taken very seriously. Calvin's political opponents were driven underground, and the freethinker Jacques Gruet and the
Unitarian'Michael Servetus were put to death by the city government.
The early history of Salem, Massachusetts, was clouded by religious intolerance and the witchcraft trials of 1692, in which 30 persons, most of them
women, were condemned; 19 of these were hanged.
116. Note, for example, the question begging of the jury instructions

given in United States v. Bush, as reported by the Seventh Circuit on appeal:
A scheme to deprive the citizens of a municipality of the honest and
loyal services of a public official comes within the meaning of the term
"scheme or artifice to defraud" as that term is used in the mail fraud
statute. Similarly, a scheme to deprive public officials of information
material to a decision which they are required to make in their official
capacity also comes within the meaning of a "scheme or artifice to defraud" as used in the mail fraud statute.
United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 651 n.10 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976).

117. We are not so sanguine as to think that in a footnote we shall in any
way remove the ambiguity about causation. Surely, since Hume's publica-
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factor in the way the scheme is carried out, and not just incidental to effecting the fraud. This construction is more consonant
with the requirement that the mailing must be "in furtherance
118
of" the fraudulent scheme.
Furthermore, the ordinary meaning of "causing a mailing"
should be revived. The defendant should actually have instigated the mailing, either by inducing the victim, or by instructing another, to mail an item furthering the scheme.
Otherwise, federal jurisdiction under the rationale that the
fraud is mail fraud seems farfetched-a procrustean bed.11 9
These proposed limitations, however, will fail to eliminate
much of the abuse in the excessive sweep of the statute as it is
now applied if public officials and private employees who retion of AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1748), philoso-

phers have made clear only the insuperable unclarity of the notion of
causation. However, I suggest as a rule of thumb way of restricting the toobroad meaning that courts have given to "knowingly causing the use of the
mails," the so-called "but for" meaning of causality.
HART & HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 103-22 (1959), contrary to the
fundamental point of view inaugurated by Hume, are willing to speak of the
causal conditions of any change as those which were in some sense necessary for its occurrence, or conditiones sine quibus non. In other words,
these conditions were such that, had any of them not occurred, the change
in question would not have occurred. Thus, the mailing must have been
absolutely indispensable to bring about the "scheme to defraud" as it was
engaged in by the defendant, according to our proposal.
118. Even in the tort law's most expansive construction of the meaning of
proximate cause, not every antecedent is deemed the cause of every consequent. So per Judge Andrews in his dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352-53, 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (1928):
What we ... mean by the word "proximate" is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not
logic. It is practical politics. Take our rule as to fires. Sparks from my
burning hay stack set on fire my house and my neighbor's. I may recover from a negligent railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as
directly harmed the one as the other. We may regret that the line was
drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said
the act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of our neighbor's
fire. Cause it surely was. The words we used were simply indicative of
our notions of public policy. Other courts think differently. But somewhere they reach the point where they cannot say the stream comes
from any one source.
Bit if there must be such limits to what will be deemed a legal cause in
tort law, afortiori,the criminal mail-fraud statute should have even greater
limitations imposed upon it. How strained to say that a defendant "caused
a mailing" when he did no more than foresee that a mailing might take
place as a result of his conduct.
119. According to such an expansive construction, a defendant has
caused a mailing in furtherance of his scheme to defraud provided that he
should have been aware that a mailing might occur when it did, and this
mailing is not in opposition to the success of the scheme. No philosophical
niceties are needed to know that "incidental to" does not ordinarily mean
"in furtherance of" and "collateral to" does not mean "caused by."
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ceive secret profits or kickbacks are automatically deemed to
have defrauded their employers by the same amount. As explained above, the recipient of a kickback is adjudged unjustly
enriched because it is inferred that the person who paid the
kickback must have been willing to make a contract more detrimental to himself, at least to the extent of the kickback. Thus,
even under the formula of tangible fraud, employees can be convicted merely of depriving their employers of a better bargain.
An employee who has an undisclosed interest in a company
with which he deals as the agent for his employer, even if he lies
in a conflict of interest statement, should not be subject to conviction under section 1341, provided the agreement that he
strikes on behalf of his employer is a fair one, i.e., within the
range of the going rate. Indeed, the direct basis for this secret
profit by the employee in such a case is his independent interest
in the other company. The employee may have signed a conflict
of interest statement that either blanketly prohibited his dealing
with any company in which he had an interest, or at least required that he divulge such an interest and receive approval
from a superior. Surely, because of the employee's pursuit of
his own economic interests, he may in fact have entered into an
agreement with one firm that is not as favorable to his employer
as another that he might have entered into with the same firm or
another. But these acts in themselves, while disloyal to the employer, would not justify a mail-fraud conviction.
A case in which an employee has received kickbacks is a
more difficult one, since he has no independent claim to such
profit and has at least betrayed if not defrauded his employer.
Nevertheless, if the bargain that the employee has struck as the
agent of his employer is a fair one, i.e., within the going rate,
then the employee should not be subject to conviction under
section 1341. Perhaps it is true that payment of the kickbacks
indicates that the contract in question could have been more advantageous to the agent's employer, at least to the extent of the
kickbacks. But it may also be true that the party paying the
kickbacks viewed them as a way of keeping the account, and
therefore as a reduction of that party's own profit, but would not
have been willing simply to pass on the discount in the form of a
reduced price for the other party to the contract. In any case,
the proposition of this article permits the concession that the
fact of the kickbacks indicates that a better contract could have
been reached than the one the agent negotiated. Indeed, this
proposal constitutes a radical departure from the way criminal
120
fraud has been viewed within the common law.
120. It is a maxim of Anglo-American contract law that courts will not
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In the cases discussed above, whether involving tangible or
fiduciary fraud, the deprivation to the victims was deprivation of
their commercial autonomy. That is, because of the deception,
the victim was unaware of a material factor in a business transaction, and accordingly was deprived of his right not to be kept
in the dark by a person who had a duty to disclose the information. At least, the victim was deprived of his right not to be misled by those with whom he deals. Accordingly, his agent's
garnering of secret profits such as kickbacks defrauds the victim
of the best price he could have obtained in the market place.
The proof that he was defrauded is found simply in the unjusti12 1
fied lack of awareness of a material fact.
To be sure, it is fundamental agency law that an agent must
devote himself exclusively and zealously to the interests of his
principal.1 2 2 Accordingly, lack of effort or other negligence on
the part of the agent is in obvious derogation of his agency, and
may result in his agreement to a contract that is far from optimal. Also, an agent may be timid or simply ineffectual and
therefore fail to strike the best possible bargain for the principal. In fact, an agent may be so distracted or exhausted by
projects of his own that he fails his principal by missing opportunities for better bargains than those struck. Wisely, the criminal law does not reach such an agent whose fulfillment of his
agency duties is deficient, although the law does permit civil redress to the principal.
Likewise, when an employer discovers that his employee
has pursued his own interests in ways that may very well interfere with the employer's best interests, the latter's grief may be
acute, especially when the employee has been especially prized
for his expertise and the employer has come to depend on him.
Past transactions that seemed good at the time are now vitiated
by the employer's suspicion that they could have been even better, and that his employee was taking advantage of him. Still,
even though the employee who receives secret profits more consciously and deliberately compromises his loyalty to his emquestion the adequacy of consideration, thus obviating the court's need to
make a judgment about the substantial fairness of a deal. Accordingly, the
fairness of transactions is preserved only indirectly by punishing, as

crimes, modes of deception by an interested party to a transaction that interfere with the commercial autonomy of the other party.
Implicit in such an analysis of what constitutes commercial autonomy
is a philosophy of contract law, i.e., commercial autonomy is preserved so
long as the contracting parties know the facts material to the contract
notwithstanding their uneven bargaining power. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKiNG CRIMINAL LAw 50-57 (1978).
121. See note 120 supra.
122.
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ployer than do employees in the other circumstances noted, the
result is the same in all those cases in which the agent struck a
good bargain but not the best one possible. The employee who,
because of his moonlighting, is not as alert as he would otherwise be during working hours for his regular employer and
therefore deprives him of better bargains than those struck,
should not be punished as a criminal. So also, the employee
who does a good job for his employer, but not the best job that
he could since he accepts secret profits, should not be subject to
criminal sanctions under section 1341.
If commercial autonomy is abandoned as the test for "a
scheme to defraud" under section 1341, the trier of fact need not
decide whether a party to a contract who was guilty of concealing, misrepresenting, or failing to reveal something was thereby
guilty of a material misrepresentation, i.e., "fraud in the inducement." Thus, according to the proposal of this article, so long as
the other party to the agreement receives value such as the going rate, the former party does not violate section 1341.
Accordingly, conviction under section 1341 would be restricted to those commonly known as swindlers and con mento those who seek to profiteer by getting something for nothing.
The intent to defraud in such cases is transparent; the transaction is so patently unfair that the trier of fact would conclude
123
there was indeed theft by deception.
123. As stated in note 53 supra, the Second Circuit in United States v.
Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1179-82 (2d Cir. 1970) and in United
States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400 (2d Cir. 1976), has rejected Judge

Learned Hand's dictum in United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir.
1932), that "false representations, in the context of a commercial transaction, are per se fraudulent despite the absence of any proof of actual injury
to any customer." United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174,
1181 (2d Cir. 1970). Furthermore, even though Judge Friendly, speaking for

the court in Dixon, found it appropriate to convict a person under § 1341 for

political corruption, he refused to rule whether a much clearer indication of
actual monetary loss is required to convict someone in the private sector.
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401 (2d Cir. 1976).
In dicta, the Regent Office Supply Co. court went even further in re-

jecting the use of § 1341 in either the public or private sector, unless there is
a clear indication that someone has indisputably suffered an economic loss
because of the other party's deceptive practices:
If there is no proof that the defendants expected to get "something
for nothing," Harrison v. United States, 200 F. 662, 666 (6th Cir. 1912) or

that they intended to get more for their merchandise than it was worth

to the average customer, it is difficult to see any intent to injure or to
defraud in the defendants' falsehoods.
421 F.2d at 1181.
George Fletcher, in his monumental study, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw
50-57 (1978), provides us with a theoretical framework for evaluating when

fraud in the inducement should be deemed criminal fraud. He notes that
German criminal fraud is narrower in scope than its Anglo-American analogue. The reason for this, according to Fletcher, is that German criminal
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Mail Fraud

This proposal to abandon the rubric of commercial autonomy applies only to the mail-fraud statute. The right of a contracting party to seek rescission for any material
misrepresentation by the other party is not affected by this proposal, nor is any other aspect of contract or quasi-contract law.
For violations of fiduciary duty, for example, an employer remains free to fire, demote, or even blackball the offending employee. If the employee received kickbacks, the employer may
still sue for restitution, petitioning the chancellor to impress a
constructive trust on the employee's proceeds.
Undoubtedly, it is proper to prosecute public officials who
have violated the public trust in various ways, for example, by
accepting bribes. But then those officials should be prosecuted
.under statutes that clearly delineate the violations. The charge
of mail fraud should not be added to the ammunition against
such officials. Contrary to Chief Justice Burger's suggestion, if
there are lacunae within the criminal law, section 1341 should
not be used as a stopgap. Instead, Congress should draft laws
that specify the abuses to be eradicated. Only in this way can
the competing objectives of punishing political and commercial
corruption yet respecting due process rights be achieved.

fraud requires interference with the victim's "net wealth," whereas the
common law protects commercial autonomy as an end in itself. Accordingly, in a case in which the defendant misrepresented synthetic goods as
"pure wool," but nonetheless gave the buyer his money's worth, the German Supreme Court held that there was no offense. Id. at 55.
The "net wealth" analysis would obviate the strained reasoning of some
courts in finding that an employer has suffered an economic loss as a result
of the employee's profit. Notwithstanding any speculation that the kickback received by the employee indicates that the contract could have been
discounted to the extent of the kickback, if the contract displays the indicia
of an arm's length transaction, fair in every way, then the alleged scheme to
defraud cannot be sustained. Using the "net wealth" rubric, then, if a transaction is fair in giving the employer good value, although a better contract
might have been struck but for the secret profit of the employee, then the
charge of criminal fraud will fail.
The common law analysis has the advantage of not requiring a substantive judgment about whether the victim received value for his money. But
the fair market price of goods is often determined by common law courts in
other contexts (e.g., in civil suits for damages or restitution). Furthermore,
the common law rubric of "commercial autonomy" is riddled with the far
more unmanageable task of defining criminal fraud in terms of legal rights
and duties.

